JUST
WHAT CRIME DID COLUMBIA/HCA COMMIT?
WALL
STREET JOURNAL, August 20, 1997, p. A15.
by
James V. DeLong
Forget
the big-screen movies. The boffo entertainment of the
summer is the Columbia/HCA Health-care scandal. Hundreds
of investigators have been deployed to ferret out supposed
Medicare fraud horrors, three Columbia employees are
under indictment, and dark hints float that the company
itself may end up in the criminal dock. The show has
legs, too. States and insurance carriers are opening
their own investigations and the vultures of the plaintiffs'
bar are drooling.
Digging
beneath the headlines, the facts look thin. The key
evidence that Columbia employees intended to defraud
Medicare is that they kept books noting that some of
their claims for reimbursement were questionable. These
were counted as revenue only after the time for audit
expired. The government view that this shows evil intent
has alarmed the entire health-care industry, since the
reimbursement rules are complex and quixotic and every
sensible company sets up reserves against disallowance.
The
indictment also cites Columbia's claims for government
repayment of interest charges. Columbia says the debt
was incurred for capital expenses. The government says
no, the borrowings went for administrative costs, and
interest on these is not reimbursable. Gotcha! It is
like a case last year in which a health-care administrator
went to jail because he classified as "outreach,"
and thus reimbursable, expenses that the government
called "advertising."
Columbia/HCA
isn't the first in the health-care industry to be accused
of criminal fraud. Last spring, several big teaching
hospitals paid hefty penalties because they made the
mistake of billing as "patient care" the time
of doctors who supervised the residents who provided
the actual hands-on care. This should have been called
"training time" and billed at a different
rate. And then there were hospices, zinged for charging
the government for care of patients kept alive longer
than the six months allowed for a "terminal illness,"
even though 90% percent of the patients did indeed expire
on schedule.
Maybe
the Medicare scandal is actually a remake. Remember
the Savings & Loan crisis, in which 6400 bank owners
and executives were charged with crimes and 3700 of
them went to jail, notwithstanding expert estimates
that only 3% of the S&L losses were due to criminal
activity? Most of the damage came from the government's
policy of encouraging S&Ls to speculate in risky
investments so as to lift themselves out of the financial
crisis caused by the rise in interest rates in the late
1970's. When this policy went sour, all branches of
government united to scapegoat those who carried it
out.
The
Columbia/HCA show may also borrow from environmental
law. Michael Weitzenhoff, manager of a sewage plant
in Hawaii, went to jail because he misinterpreted the
terms of a discharge permit and released 6% too much
sewage. Joseph Wilson, a Maryland real estate developer,
faces a jail sentence based on his disagreement with
the government's mind-numbing definition of what is
a sacrosanct "wetland."
The
pattern is getting steadily clearer. The past 25 years
have seen spectacular growth in the use of punitive
measures against executives, managers, entrepreneurs,
professionals, and landowners. These include not just
criminal jail terms and fines but civil penalties, asset
forfeitures, punitive damages, and other forms of punishment
--
Not
at all coincidentally, this growth parallels the rise
of the regulatory state. Command-and-control must be
backed up, and Congress has, without much thought, adopted
the criminal code and other harsh punishments as its
chosen instruments.
But
applying this system in a regulatory context causes
major problems--the first of which is figuring out precisely
what the law is. Statutes can run on for hundreds of
pages of detail and are enforced by volumes of convoluted
administrative regulations and even greater piles of
interpretations, guidelines and exceptions. It is often
impossible for anyone to fully know the law, even with
the best of intentions.
This
complexity affects hundreds of billions of dollars in
subsidies, payments, and added business costs, which
in turn creates incentives for private actors to interpret
ambiguity in their own favor. The system is also captured
by special interests, which harness government power
to their own ends. All this results in commands that
lack moral legitimacy, and this naturally breeds resistance
and efforts at avoidance and even outright evasion.
The
government is reacting to these tensions in simplistic
fashion. Instead of moving away from command-and-control
and toward reliance on markets and incentives, it is
hardening its legal positions. Mistakes and disagreements
are assumed to be malicious, not a result of human error
or legitimate difference of opinion. Prosecutors work
to eliminate intent and knowledge as elements of regulatory
offenses. Everyone is presumed to know the law, even
if a requirement is unsettled or buried in obscure guidance
letters.
The
Columbia/HCA situation, in which awareness of uncertainty
is taken as proof of guilt, is becoming common. Mistakes
of fact, honest efforts to comply, and even misleading
government interpretations are not defenses. Matters
that should be hashed out as contract disputes are turned
into criminal cases.
The
medical system is hit particularly hard when disputes
over the allocation of indirect overhead under arcane
principles of cost accounting get escalated into criminal
fraud. This problem will surely worsen as arbitrary
price controls are implemented and care providers try
to shift costs into reimbursable categories..
Punishment
of trivia is increasing. Violations of nit-picking paperwork
requirements are treated harshly since these are easy
to prove. The world is full of paperwork errors and
anyone can be indicted if an agency has a mind. This
saves investigative time when the government thinks
a company might have done something serious but cannot
prove it.
In
the end, everyone is at the mercy of agency and prosecutorial
discretion, and everyone had better learn to say "Mother,
may I?" before taking a step in any direction.
This is an odd condition for a nation that prides itself
on both its rule of law and its entrepreneurial verve.
JAMES
V. DeLONG
Washington
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