|
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Myths
of Light-Rail Transit
By
James V. DeLong
Contents
Executive
Summary
Introduction
Myth #1
The
Myth: Rail transit is rapid transit.
The
Reality: When the time needed for station access,
transfer, waiting, and delay is taken into account,
rail travel time is longer than the time required for
the same trip by bus.
Myth #2
The
Myth: Rail transit is high-capacity transit.
The
Reality: Bus corridors have more capacity than
any single rail line.
Myth #3
The
Myth: Rail transit will decongest roads by
converting automobile users into users of mass transit.
The
Reality: Rail transit is not a decongestant.
Drivers support for rail transit is based on a hope
that other drivers will use rail transit and open up
the road; in fact, the majority of rail riders are taken
out of buses, not cars.
Myth #4
The
Myth: Rail transit is cost-effective.
The
Reality: Rail transit is economically inferior
to conventional bus service.
Myth #5
The
Myth: Rail transit promotes superior urban
form.
The
Reality: Urban planners idea of superior formhigh
densities of both residences and places of employmentis
counter to most peoples values. In any event, rail transit
cannot overcome the forces pushing for decentralization.
Myth #6
The
Myth: Rail transit benefits low-income people.
The
Reality: The switch to rail transit imposes
heavy costs on low-income people.
Myth #7
The
Myth: Rail transit construction is a good way
to provide jobs.
The
Reality: Bus systems provide more jobs per
public dollar expended, and more local employment.
Myth #8
The
Myth: Capital investment in rail transit will
be paid for with nonlocal funds that cannot be used
for other purposes.
The
Reality: Although funds requested for rail
transit often must be spent for that purpose, localities
may seek funds for a variety of purposes and have considerable
discretion over how local transportation funds are spent.
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Executive
Summary
Local
officials in many urban areas have become smitten with
the hope that "light rail" will provide the
solution to urban transportation problems. This dream
is based on myths, and will be rudely shattered when
the realities reassert themselves. The most important
of these myths are:
The
Speed Myth:
Rail
transit is rapid transit. |
The
Reality:
When
the time needed for station access, transfer, waiting,
and delay is taken into account, rail travel times are
longer than the time required for the same trip by bus. |
|
The
Capacity Myth:
Rail
is high-capacity transit. |
The
Reality:
Bus
corridors, which consist of several parallel lines operating
on urban streets, have vastly more capacity than any
single rail line. Even a single-line dedicated bus right-of-way
has greater carrying capacity than a light rail line.
Only the most heavily used heavy rail trunk lines have
greater capacity than busways, and these have significantly
higher costs. |
|
The
Decongestion Myth:
Rail
will decongest roads by converting automobile drivers
into mass transit riders. |
The
Reality:
Rail
is not a decongestant. Support for rail voiced by drivers
is based on a hope that others will use rail transit
and open up the road, and in fact rail riders are taken
out of buses, not cars. |
|
The
Cost-Effectiveness Myth:
Rail
transit is cost-effective. |
The
Reality:
Rail
is economically inferior to conventional bus service. |
|
The
Urban Form Myth:
Rail
promotes superior urban form. |
The
Reality:
The
urban planners' idea of "superior form" --
high densities of both residences and places of employment
-- is counter to the values of the populace. In any
event, rail cannot overcome the forces pushing for decentralization. |
|
The
Low-Income Myth:
Rail
transit benefits low-income people. |
The
Reality:
The
switch to rail imposes heavy costs on low-income people. |
|
The
Jobs Myth:
Rail
construction provides jobs. |
The
Reality:
Bus
systems provide more jobs per public dollar expended,
and more local employment. |
|
The
"Free Money" Myth:
Capital
investment in rail will be paid for with non-local funds
that cannot be used for other purposes. |
The
Reality:
While
funds requested for rail must often be spent on rail,
localities may seek funds for a variety of purposes
and have considerable discretion over how local transportation
funds are spent. |
|
Good
transit policies are within the grasp of every urban
area, but they will not be found until decision-makers
divest themselves of these myths and build their programs
on solid reality. |
|
Part
1
Introduction
It
isn't what you don't know that ruins you; it's all the
things you do know that turn out to be wrong.
--Old
Adage
Local-government
officials are ambitious, in the best sense of that word.
They want to do good for their communities and be remembered
for improving the lives of the people. Most might not
say it aloud, but they occasionally think that someday
there might be a plaque in the town center informing
future generations of their contributions.
This
laudable ambition makes them keenly interested in anything
that promises to solve a continuing and mounting problem:
urban transportation and road congestion. In recent
years, officials have heard a strong pitch for a purported
cure for this problem. It is called light-rail, and
it is promoted with glitzy literature that usually combines
"vision," "high-tech," and "long-term
solution" all in the same paragraph. The pitch
is always backed by elaborate projections, multicolor
charts and graphs, consultants with imposing arrays
of academic credentials, and promises of federal grants.
And it is accompanied by extravagant promises about
ridership, costs, and effects on traffic congestion
and urban form. Not surprisingly, local officials are
finding this siren song quite seductive. Fifteen cities
that already possess such systems are considering major
extensions, and 18 cities are considering new systems.
But
the faith in light-rail transit is based on a series
of myths. The truth is that light-rail systems drain
off astonishing amounts of tax dollars, exacerbate automobile
congestion, harm bus transportation, and undermine desirable
development patterns.
For
urban officials who send their communities down this
track, the story will not end happily. Any monuments
that get built to them will trigger a joke that circulated
after the breakup of the Soviet Union: A mayor, asked
why his city had left standing a statue of Stalin, answered:
"So the pigeons can speak for all of us, every
day." Any local official who would rather not
be remembered in the community primarily as an appropriate
target for pigeons should start digging into the facts
about light-rail.
A.
Origins of Urban Transit Systems
Before
the time of the Civil War, urban transportation choices
were simple: you walked, got on a horse, or rode in
a carriage. The first urban public transportation systems,
which started up before the Civil War, were horse-drawn
omnibuses. By the 1880s, 100,000 horses were pulling
18,000 cars over 3,500 miles of track, nationwide. [1]
By
the 1870s, cities were in the throes of a full-fledged
transportation crisis. Narrow streets were jammed with
wagons and carriages, and "traffic became an obsession,
the overwhelming civic issue. Engravings in the illustrated
periodicals portrayed this urban chaos in terms borrowed
from the Apocalypse." [2]
The transportation crisis was also an environmental
and health crisis. The 3.5 million horses resident in
urban America each produced 20 pounds of waste daily,
much of which wound up on the streets or in manure pits
within the city limits. The result was both indescribable
stench and creation of breeding grounds for flyborne
disease. Dead horses were also a serious problem. The
animals were cruelly used, with an average life expectancy
of two years, and New York scavengers removed 15,000
carcasses per year. [3]
To all these disamenities must be added noise pollution,
as thousands of iron wagon wheels scraped across cobblestones.
These
limitations on people's mobility also forced heavy population
densities. The ethnic neighborhoods of New York were
teeming not because America lacked space but because
of the high costs of transportation in both energy and
time. In the New York of 1850 to 1890, over 75 percent
of the population lived in crowded tenements. [4]
Lack of mobility imposed other costs as well. Workers
who can search for jobs only within walking distance
of their homes have limited opportunities, and consumers
cannot seek out variety and bargains. If a poorly stocked,
high-priced corner store is the only thing within toting
distance, that is where customers must buy.
Starting
around 1880, three transit revolutions in succession
gave American cities room to grow and breathe again.
The first two--the electric streetcar and heavy-rail
(subways and elevated trains)--were based on rails and
made the old 19th-century cities livable again. The
third was based on the automobile and created the new
urban forms of the 20th century.
Heavy-rail
systems, such as New York's subways or the Chicago El,
are expensive to build and operate. To make economic
sense, they require high population densities at both
origin and destination points. These systems have always
received disproportionate attention in the national
media because of their importance to New York, the nation's
biggest media center. In fact, from a national perspective,
heavy-rail has never been of great importance. Even
today, after massive infusions of federal money, only
14 heavy-rail systems are in operation. New York, Boston,
Chicago, and Philadelphia were the only U.S. cities
to build heavy-rail around the turn of the 20th century,
when they represented cutting-edge technology and economics,
and when the labor needed for the task cost about $1
per day. Later systems, such as those in Washington,
Baltimore, Atlanta, San Francisco, and Los Angeles,
were based largely on myth and nostalgia, along with
federal subsidies, and are economic and aesthetic disasters.
The
first electric street railway line--the trolley--was
built in Cleveland in 1884, and thereafter these systems
proliferated throughout urban America. These were useful
indeed. Before their creation, the limits on mobility
had forced commercial, industrial, and residential sections
to be crammed together. The streetcar created the possibility
of the radial city and the separation of uses. It still
required considerable residential density, because people
needed to live within walking distance of the streetcar
stops, but it greatly increased the usable space within
cities. The standard pattern was a downtown core for
employment and major retail, with residential suburbs
concentrated around the trolley line.
The
trolley was a tremendous step forward in 1900, but it
still constrained personal mobility in significant ways.
Residences had to be concentrated near the trolley line,
and the system was better for commuting to work than
for errand-running, socializing, or other kinds of trips.
Because of these limitations, people were ready for
the next great revolution in mobility: the automobile
and its cousin, the bus. Americans fell in love with
the personal vehicle, with its flexibility, scheduling
convenience, comfort, carrying capacity, and speed.
As of 1903, 60 automobile companies had sold 11,000
vehicles. By 1930, 26.5 million cars were on the road,
and the numbers kept on exploding: 32 million in 1940,
48.6 million in 1950, 200 million in 1996. There is
now an average of more than two cars for each of America's
97 million households. [5]
The
automobile opened up tremendous options for new urban
forms. Because of the heavy investment in existing buildings,
old cities retained their radial character, but their
outskirts, and the newer cities of the West, grew in
a different pattern. By the late 20th century, commercial
and employment centers had become spaced out around
the periphery, not concentrated downtown, and the majority
of all commuting trips are now suburb to suburb, not
suburb to city. The dominant pattern in one metropolitan
area after another has become one of "edge cities,"
described by reporter Joel Garreau in 1991: a number
of dispersed "downtowns" rather than a single
large core. [6]
The automobile also permitted low-density residential
development, which accords with a human passion for
houses with yards.
As
the automobile changed the patterns of urban life, mass
transit came to be dominated by buses, which have significant
advantages over rail transit. They are flexible, they
require no special rights of way, and they are much
cheaper. However, they are subject to the delays caused
by automobile congestion and are perceived by the upper
and middle classes as rather downscale. The mode share
of public transit of all kinds reached an apogee right
after World War II and has declined steadily ever since
(see Figure 1).
B.
Current Concerns
The
success of the automobile in meeting the human desire
for mobility has created a series of problems that together
are perceived as an "urban transportation crisis."
These problems, which are the triggers for the increasing
interest and investment in urban rail systems, can be
boiled down to concern over:
-
road congestion and increased travel times,
-
pollution,
-
dispersal of population,
-
the amount of land devoted to roads and parking, and
-
the very idea of a metropolitan area without a dominating
central core.
The
myths that support the construction of expensive rail
systems all revolve around beliefs that rail transit
is the answer to these problems and, equally important,
that bus systems are not the answer to the problems.
The most important of these myths are that rail transit:
-
is rapid;
-
has a high capacity as compared to buses;
-
will decongest roads;
-
is cost-effective;
All
of these are false, for the reasons detailed in the
following sections.
Part
2
Myth
1: The Speed Myth
The
Myth: Rail transit is rapid transit.
The
Reality: When the time needed for station
access, transfer, waiting, and delay is taken into account,
rail travel time is longer than the time required for
the same trip by bus.
Local
officials are caught up in the romantic image of the
speeding train. In the words of one: "[Riders]
can just go over and get on a light rail car. I mean,
they're--whoosh--gone." Or another: "If
I were on the Ventura Freeway--or you--driving, and
you saw a train go by at 65 mph, filled with smiling
air-cooled faces, tomorrow you're going to take the
train." [7]
The
image is not the reality. The average speed of the light-rail
Blue Line in Los Angeles is 21 miles per hour, not 65,
and the heavy-rail Red Line moves at 24 miles per hour.
[8]
Also, estimates of rail speed uniformly ignore the time
required for the patron to get to the station and wait.
Many patrons must walk to a bus stop, wait, take the
bus to the train station, walk to the train, wait, travel
at 24 mph, perhaps walk to another bus, wait, and take
this bus to near their final destination, and then walk.
Studies
in Los Angeles have shown that overall travel times
on rail transit are longer than the same trips on the
old bus routes, by factors of up to 100 percent.[9]
A Reason Foundation analysis of commuter-rail notes:
"After Metrolink service began in 1992, the [Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA)]
staff was unable to find a single case in which it is
faster to complete a trip in the MTA service area by
taking Metrolink. . . . . Bus trips also had significantly
lower fares, required fewer transfers, and had shorter
headways. Buses operated for longer periods of the day
and on weekends and holidays, and offered more convenient
access."[10]
Metrolink is commuter-rail over a long distance, where
any speed advantage of rail should be the greatest,
which means that the losses in time imposed when a light-rail
system replaces a preexisting bus network used for short
trips will be even greater.
This
result of converting a transit system from buses to
rail--increases in most travel times--is inevitable
when the problem is analyzed closely. Suppose that a
large number of commuters travel each day from the north
side of town to downtown. In most cities, several radial
streets will run from the downtown to different segments
of the north side. A traveler gets to the nearest radial
by foot, kiss-and-ride, or feeder bus, then travels
directly. Now, suppose a rail line is built. Because
rail is expensive, the north side will be served by
only one line, not by a whole series of them. Few of
the commuters can walk to it, and the drop-off point
is no longer convenient for other household members.
So most people must take a feeder bus sideways across
town, then go down the rail line, and then take a bus
across town again. Even if the rail segment is faster
than a bus, the time lost on the sideways trips cannot
be made up.
Given
the choice, most of these riders would prefer to continue
to take the bus. But the local transit authority, having
invested millions or even billions of dollars in a rail
system, cannot allow this. So the buses no longer run
down the radials, and the travelers are forced to go
to the rail line. Because their trips now take longer,
some decide to drive their cars. So while the rail system
looks crowded because it is now handling the traffic
that used to be spread over multiple bus routes, total
transit patronage may actually decline.[11]
In fact, all but one of the 10 cities that added light-rail
or heavy-rail systems in the 1970s and 1980s saw their
transit market share decline during the 1980s (see Figure
2). An investment of billions of dollars in urban rail
transit makes everyone worse off.
Part
3
Myth
2: The Capacity Myth
The
Myth: Rail transit is high-capacity transit.
The
Reality: Bus corridors have more capacity
than any single rail line.
Proponents
of rail transit make statements such as: "There
is not enough room on the streets of [any city] to accommodate
all the buses that would be needed to carry the passengers
served by a single rail line."
Such
statements are untrue.
In
the first place, the correct comparison is not between
a single rail line and a single street. It is between
a single rail line and the several parallel streets
that constitute a bus corridor. The corridor
usually has greater capacity than the rail line, and
it is more convenient for passengers as well. Even a
single-line dedicated bus right-of-way has greater carrying
capacity than a light-rail line. Only the most heavily
used heavy-rail trunk lines have greater capacity than
busways, and these have significantly higher costs.
Furthermore,
the myth is not true in its own terms. A study in Los
Angeles found that buses rather easily matched the capacity
of the Blue Line, which has by far the highest average
passenger load of all U.S. light-rail lines, and may
have the highest peak passenger load. [12]
It would take only 103 buses in local service or 57
in freeway express service to match the carrying capacity
provided by the 20 rail cars needed to provide one hour's
service. Furthermore, the cost of the buses would be
a fraction of the cost of rail, because the buses' share
of the road cost is a fraction of the cost of rail right-of-way,
and buses cost about $300,000 a piece, versus $3 million
for each light-rail car.[13]
Another
study conducted in Los Angeles found that its one operational
busway has three times the capacity of its best light-rail
line (see Table 1). The same study found that if busways
are opened up to use by three-person carpools, they
can provide nearly six times the capacity of a freeway
lane--which exceeds even the performance of some heavy-rail
lines (see Figure 3). [14]
Table
1: Peak-Hour Ridership in Los Angeles: Busway and Light-Rail |
El Monte Busway:
Actual |
Blue Line:
Actual |
Buses or Trains per Hour (Peak Direction) |
49 |
10 |
Cars per Bus or Train |
1 |
2 |
Average Load per Car (passengers) |
31.2 |
62.6 |
Average Operating Speed (mph) |
52 |
21 |
Passenger Miles per Hour |
79,498 |
26,305 |
Source:
Thomas A. Rubin and James E. Moore II, "Better
Transportation Alternatives for Los Angeles," Reason
Public Policy Institute, Policy Study No. 232, September
1997, p. 12.
Note:
The busway figures are based only on buses using the
right-of-way. This busway also accommodates carpools
of three or more people, giving it a total throughput
of 292,986 passenger miles per hour, or approximately
10 times that of the Blue Line.
Part
4
Myth
3: The Decongestion Myth
The
Myth: Rail transit will decongest roads by
converting automobile users into users of mass transit.
The
Reality: Rail transit is not a decongestant.
Drivers support for rail transit is based on a hope
that other drivers will use rail transit and open up
the road; in fact, the majority of rail riders are taken
out of buses, not cars.
Proponents
of rail say that automobile users support construction
of light-rail lines. They buttress the point with surveys
of drivers in which the respondents endorse rail construction
and with election results in which people approve special-purpose
taxes. These results are represented as evidence that
drivers are eager to ride the rails.
The
surveys and election results are real, but the conclusion
is wrong. Drivers are indeed enthusiastic about rail
lines, but only because they think that many others
will ride the transit and leave the road clear for the
driver. An endorsement of transit construction is a
vote for an open road, free of all those pesky other
drivers.
The
misinterpretation of the reasons for public support
of transit systems also produces serious overestimates
of likely ridership, which leads to disastrous economic
forecasts. In the late 1970s, District of Columbia officials
predicted that their $10 billion, 92-mile heavy-rail
system would boast an annual ridership of 323 million.
As of 1995, with the system nearly completed, ridership
was 159 million.[15]
In Portland, Oregon, transportation planners said that
a light-rail line would be built in three years for
$135 million and would carry nearly 60,000 people per
day after 10 years; in fact, the line took four years
and $210 million to build, and it carried only 27,000
people per day after 10 years. [16]
And a 1990 U.S. Department of Transportation report
found that overall, heavy-rail systems have ridership
shortfalls averaging 35 percent of their forecasts,
and light-rail systems have shortfalls of a stunning
65 percent.[17]
These
shortfalls in ridership are not well known to the public
or to municipal officials. They are obscured by a practice
reminiscent of the bait-and-switch tactics used by fast-talking
retailers. [18]
Optimistic ridership forecasts are used when a project
is first under consideration. Then, after the funding
is obtained and the construction is well under way,
the forecasts are revised downward drastically. After
operation begins, the transit authority happily announces
that ridership "exceeds forecasts," without
noting that this refers to the second, revised forecast,
not to the original predictions used in selling the
project.
Because
traffic congestion is greatest at the beginning and
end of normal working hours, it is easy to jump to the
conclusion that all the cars on the road during these
rush hours are making journeys to or from work. This
conclusion leads to the belief that building transit
systems that run along the main commuting corridors
will automatically relieve the congestion. But this
conclusion does not follow. Rush-hour commuting is important,
obviously, but it is not nearly as dominant as most
people assume. In the D.C. area, 75 percent of all automobile
trips involve errands--taking the kids to school, going
to the doctor, or performing the other multiple errands
of every family.[19]
Nationwide, 39 percent of morning rush-hour trips and
60 percent of afternoon rush-hour trips are not work-related
(see Figure 4).
Given
the current realities of transit service, these errand
trips will be taken by car by everyone except people
who cannot afford to buy one. A report on the D.C. bus
system cited the common experience of an inner-city
mother who takes two buses to drop her child off at
day care, then a third one to work. The trip takes an
hour and a half.[20]
It
is also a mistake to assume that there are identifiable
"commuting corridors" that accommodate most
of the job-related trips. Increasingly, people live
in one suburb and work in another; they do not go from
a suburb down a corridor to a central downtown.[21]
In the five-county Los Angeles metropolitan area, districts
with job densities greater than 12,500 per square mile
account for only 17 percent of all jobs, and even these
are spread over 19 different centers. The remaining
83 percent of the jobs are dispersed throughout the
area. [22]
Reporter
Joel Garreau's book Edge City documents this
trend nationwide by examining the proportion of office
space inside and outside the central business district
(CBD) for 13 U.S. cities and four foreign ones. In the
United States, only New Orleans and Pittsburgh had dominant
CBDs, with 69 percent and 66 percent of the office space
in their respective areas. In the other U.S. cities,
the CBD's share ranged from 24 percent in Tampa to 33
percent in Denver to 49 percent in Philadelphia. [23]
And this, of course, takes into account only office
space; it does not take into account industrial or commercial
employment, where the CBD share is even lower. The "commuting
corridors" concept, which assumes a downtown employment
core surrounded by suburbs, is hopelessly out of date.
The
assumption that rail transit can decongest roads rests
on another erroneous assumption. Even in an old-style
radial city, with employment concentrated in a CBD,
rail transit makes sense only if residential areas also
have high population densities. Otherwise, commuters
must get in their cars, drive to a station, park, walk,
wait, and entrain. Many of them, once in their cars,
will find it more convenient to keep going. Very few
U.S. cities have residential densities sufficient to
make rail transit a viable option.
If
rail transit does not draw passengers from autos, where
do they come from? The answer is clear: from buses.
A 1996 Los Angeles study found that 63 percent of rail
passengers had switched from the bus. Another 6 percent
used to be driven by others, 6 percent had walked, and
4 percent were taking trips they would not have taken
but for the rail line. Only 21 percent were riding instead
of driving alone.[24]
Can
drivers be lured onto rail transit, abandoning their
cars? Surely, for some trips. If a station exists within
walking distance of a potential rider's home, she has
nothing to carry, the weather is good, the transit is
cheap, fast, frequent, and round-the-clock, no transfers
are required, and the station at the other end is within
walking distance of her destination, then even a hard-core
driver might be amenable to switching. Unfortunately
the percentage of urban trips meeting this list of criteria
is minuscule. In Portland, for example, only 1 percent
of the population lives within walking distance of a
light-rail station.[25]
Transit experts Stephen Mueller and Dennis Polhill say
that experience from numerous cities shows that only
about 5 percent of commuters who are bound for the downtown
area actually regularly use a light-rail system once
it is built.[26]
Part
5
Myth
4: The Cost-Effectiveness Myth
The
Myth: Rail transit is cost-effective.
The
Reality: Rail transit is economically inferior
to conventional bus service.
An
important analysis of the costs of rail systems was
published by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
in 1990. It found that the average cost per one-way
passenger trip on recently built light-rail systems
was $9.44. For heavy-rail systems, the cost was $9.85.
[27]
As
is required for sound economic analysis, these figures
include the cost of constructing the facilities, amortized
over time, as well as operating costs. Advocates of
rail transit sometimes obfuscate the issue by citing
cost figures that include operating costs but exclude
the cost of construction. If a private corporation tried
to use such accounting, its officers would wind up in
jail. Calculating transit costs without including the
cost of construction is like an individual calculating
the costs of owning an automobile by adding up his gas
and oil charges while ignoring both the purchase price
and the interest on his purchase loan.
The
Los Angeles rail system was not included in the DOT
study, because it was not operating at the time. A later
study found that costs per one-way trip in Los Angeles
were even higher than the costs in the cities studied
by the DOT. As of 1993, the cost per trip on the light-rail
Blue Line was $11.90; on the heavy-rail Red Line, it
was $26.83; and on the commuter-rail Metrolink, it was
a whopping $40.09.[28]
This Los Angeles study is particularly valuable because
it compares rail costs and bus costs on the same system,
finding the cost per passenger on the Los Angeles bus
system to be $1.79. Nor does rail transit look better
when judged on the basis of passenger miles instead
of passengers. Los Angeles light-rail passengers are
subsidized to the tune of $1.26 per passenger mile,
while the subsidy for bus passengers is $0.23 per passenger
mile. [29]
Part
6
Myth
5: The Urban-Form Myth
The
Myth: Rail transit promotes superior urban
form.
The
Reality: Urban planners idea of superior formhigh
densities of both residences and places of employmentis
counter to most peoples values. In any event, rail transit
cannot overcome the forces pushing for decentralization.
As
the high costs and low benefits of rail transit have
become increasingly apparent, even to those most reluctant
to accept the data, some prorail forces have shifted
their ground. They have changed their emphasis away
from quantifiable effects and turned to qualitative
arguments about superior urban form and unmeasured benefits
that are claimed to result from transit-oriented development.[30]
This
myth breaks down into two issues. First, what is the
desired form, and why is it regarded as superior? Second,
does rail transit actually create that form?
The
first of these questions is easily answerable. Urban
planners have gotten carried away by the idea that high
population density is a good thing. They favor multifamily
housing and small lots for those individual houses that
are permitted. They also favor compact retail and business
areas. Their ideal is a community in which people walk
to both work and shopping.
The
logical question is: why do planners think these things?
People who lived in the congested tenements of New York
City in the 19th century did not think it was heaven.
High-density living and working has some advantages,
and some people like it a lot. It also has some serious
disadvantages, and some people dislike it intensely.
Some people are in the middle; they would like to have
neighborhood shops within walking distance, but they
recognize that this form is not compatible with the
low prices, large selection, and low transaction costs
that result from supermarkets, malls, and discount stores.
Because they place high value on conserving their resources
of money and time, they choose--rationally--the less-dense
form.
Planners
are also obsessed with the idea that "sprawl"
is evil, that an urban area should use as little land
as possible. Portland, Oregon, which has placed a legal
boundary on growth, has become the planners' ideal.
Again, the question is: why? The United States is blessed
with ample land. All of our urbanized land covers only
about 2.6 percent of the area of the lower 48 states.[31]
Occasionally, one hears jeremiads that the nation is
"running out of farmland," but these concerns
border on the ludicrous. The nation has a surfeit of
farmland.[32]
About 5 percent of the area of the lower 48 states,
twice as much as the land devoted to urban development,
is good farmland that is not used to grow crops; it
is used as pasture or forest or simply lies fallow.
[33]
If the pejorative word "sprawl" is dropped,
and the neutral term "dispersal of population"
used instead, it becomes difficult to understand why
the planners are so against it.
The
impacts of the Portland growth boundary are already
being felt. Housing prices are rising, to the detriment
of newcomers, and open spaces within the city are being
filled in, to the detriment of all. Portlanders are
giving up usable, valuable close-in green space to prevent
development in outlying areas that most residents never
see. [34]
It is the equivalent of New York City turning Central
Park into a housing development so as to avoid the need
to build homes in rural New Jersey.
It
is fortunate that the high-density utopia of the planners
is not really desirable, because rail transit has no
chance of producing it. High density runs counter to
the realities of urban economics. The high-rise buildings
necessary to produce high densities are expensive to
build. The expense makes sense only if transportation
costs are high enough to dominate the extra construction
costs. This is simply not true in contemporary America.
A business can locate in the suburbs, cut its construction
costs, and reduce its employees' transportation costs.
Furthermore, technological development is working against
the high densities necessary for rail transit. Existing
trends toward dispersal have been fostered by electrification,
radio and telephonic communication, and the development
of trucking and highway systems. These trends are being
reinforced by the widespread use of computers and telecommunications,
which are increasing society's capacities for effective
interaction among people who are distant from each other.
All these forces reduce the incentives for concentrated
settlement patterns.
Given
these basic economic forces, it is not possible for
rail transit to produce the planners' vision of a high-density
utopia. This is all to the good, because the vision
does not correspond to the desires of the majority of
Americans. Any public official listening to a pitch
for rail transit and the concomitant need for high density
should keep in mind an image from a few years ago: news
photos showing the demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe public
housing project in St. Louis. Massive, expensive public
housing projects were once the planners' version of
urban utopia. They did not work. In fact, they turned
into hideous jungles of dysfunction that could be cured
only with dynamite. The planners, of course, never had
to live in them or cope with the consequences. They
just invented new visions of utopia.
The
Pruitt-Igoe experience is hardly unique. A recent Washington
Post headline read: "New Generation of City
Planners Rethinks '60s-Era Waterside Mall."[35]
The story began: "Nearly 30 years ago, the best
minds in urban planning decreed that a giant retail
and office complex should be erected," and then
described some of the unpleasant consequences of this
decision. The bulk of the article was devoted to the
new and expensive ideas of today's "best minds
in urban planning," most of which seem to be that
the old expensive ideas were all wrong.
The
"best minds in urban planning" now have a
vision of expensive rail transit facilities. When these
are shown to be mistakes, the planners will again walk
away, while the communities who served as the laboratory
rats for their experiments are stuck with the bill.
Part
7
Myth
6: The Rail-Serves-the-Poor Myth
The
Myth: Rail transit benefits low-income people.
The
Reality: The switch to rail transit imposes
heavy costs on low-income people.
Low-income
transit users are captives. They have no alternatives
to public transit, no matter how low the quality or
how high the cost of service. In contrast, middle- and
upper-income travelers are optional riders (or, as they
are often called in the literature, "choice"
riders). They have alternatives, especially the automobile,
and will not tolerate the conditions that often confront
low-income riders. The usage patterns of this group
are also different from the patterns of low-income riders.
The latter make many short trips on public transit.
They go to the grocery store, the doctor, social calls,
and so on. Optional riders, even those eager to make
the journey to work by rail transit, tend to use their
cars for these other errands.
Rail
systems, even at their inefficient best, cater to the
commutes of the wealthier segments of the communities.
In doing so, they create route patterns that are poorly
adapted to the needs of the low-income users. As noted
before, rail transit forces everyone to make a long
sideways trip to reach a trunk line designed for commuting
to a downtown, a pattern that can make what was once
a short bus ride to a nearby doctor into an hour-and-a-half
ordeal.
Transit
systems also strip resources from the bus systems that
serve the needs of the low-income riders, because available
funds must be funneled into fulfilling the extravagant
promises made to satisfy the middle- and upper-class
constituency that advocates rail systems. As a result,
the buses grow older and shabbier, headways become less
frequent, and mechanical breakdowns increase. So, in
addition to its effect of distorting bus route patterns
in ways that increase the burdens on the less-affluent
segment of the populace--the segment that has no option
except to use public transit--rail construction results
in a degradation of the bus service that remains. This
sacrifice of the vital interests of lower-income people
to subsidize the urban upper classes is morally unjustifiable.
A
court of law in Los Angeles also thinks that draining
money from buses to subsidize rail transit is legally
unjustifiable. In 1996, a federal judge ruled that the
Metropolitan Transit Authority's program of steering
subsidies into rail rather than bus transportation discriminated
against the low-income and largely minority population
that depends on the buses. The MTA is now operating
under a consent decree designed to ensure fair treatment
for the bus riders.
Part
8
Myth
7: The Jobs Myth
The
Myth: Rail transit construction is a good
way to provide jobs.
The
Reality: Bus systems provide more jobs per
public dollar expended, and more local employment.
The
Los Angeles transit authority found that rail construction
creates one person-year of employment for each $414,793
of taxpayer money. Rail operation produces one year
of employment for every $88,253 in subsidies. Bus operation
creates one job for each $65,737 in public subsidy.
[36]
Furthermore,
the jobs created by bus service are local. So are the
jobs created by other bus operating expenditures, such
as parts, fuel services, rent, and so on. In contrast,
many of the jobs created by rail construction are located
far away; most rail cars, for example, come from Japan,
Italy, and Germany, not from U.S. sources. Most U.S.
cities will have similar experiences--rail construction
may boost some city's economy, but it will not be their
own.
Part
9
Myth
8: The Federal-and-State-Money Myth
The
Myth: Capital investment in rail transit will
be paid for with nonlocal funds that cannot be used
for other purposes.
The
Reality: Although funds requested for rail
transit often must be spent for that purpose, localities
may seek funds for a variety of purposes and have considerable
discretion over how local transportation funds are spent.
The
gist of this argument is that some pots of money earmarked
for rail construction are available from federal and
state governments and that, therefore, a locality should
build a rail system to get on the gravy train.
There
are two rejoinders to this. The first is that some federal
and state funds are less restricted than transit advocates
would have you believe. Most important, federal Section
3 funds can be used for bus purchases as well as for
rail construction.
The
second is that the pursuit of supposedly "free"
federal or state funds is a fool's quest. As Rubin and
Moore found out in the case of Los Angeles, rail transit
can be 10 to 13 times as expensive as bus service in
terms of total capital cost per unit of transit service
provided. [37]
Urban officials with experience in these matters estimate
that nonflexible federal funds might be procured to
cover no more than 50 percent of budgeted capital costs
of rail projects, and a lower proportion of actual costs.
(And, as noted earlier, all rail projects incur substantial
cost overruns.) On the other hand, federal funds can
be obtained to pay for 80 percent of the capital acquisition
costs of bus transit.
When
these numbers are combined, the bottom line is that
the rail option is 20 times as costly as bus service
in terms of its demand on local capital funds.[38]
Part
10
Conclusion:
Making Sense of Transit Policy
A
final argument for rail is that "nothing else works,"
or "there are no alternatives." This is simply
untrue. The essentials of a good transit policy are
obvious to anyone who studies the problem with an objective
eye and a respect for facts.
The
first step is to approach transit as a business, and
the first rule of any business is to look at what your
customers want. The low-income, transit-dependent people
who constitute the base of ridership want the obvious:
frequent and reliable service; longer service hours;
multiple and convenient lines; express routes for long
distances; good information; and a high level of security.
So start by giving it to them. To those who say that
the city cannot afford it, the answer is easy: For a
tiny percentage of the money you are willing to fritter
away on rail transit, you could gold-plate every bus,
red-carpet every bus stop, and provide airline-style
steward service en route.
Good
service will bring out latent demand among the basic
ridership group, but there is, of course, a limit. The
next target should be those optional riders who can
be attracted to bus service most easily by improvements
in service and facilities. These improvements--plus
such innovations as intersuburb service, reserved lanes
on freeways, and dedicated busways--offer great potential
to increase patronage from optional riders.
The
real measure of the poor management that characterizes
public transit systems is not the number of families
who want an automobile. A car is highly desirable, and
every family will buy one as soon as possible. The problem
is the number of families who are buying not just one
car, but a second, a third, and a fourth. Automobiles
are expensive. Many of these families would certainly
rather have one car for general needs and rely on public
transit for many of the family's trips. The fact that
they are willing to incur the huge costs of extra cars
is powerful proof of the failure of transit managers
to keep in touch with the needs of their customers.
Besides
improving bus transit to make it competitive with automobile
use, two other steps are necessary to create a sound
urban transit system. Both are designed to reintroduce
market solutions:
1.
Automobile users do not pay the full costs of the roads
it takes to service them during peak hours, or of the
pollution and congestion costs that each driver imposes
on others. For 30 years, economists have been urging
the virtues of congestion pricing, which means that
drivers would pay a variable toll for road use according
to time of day or degree of congestion.[39]
The revolution in technology is making this option increasingly
feasible by means of nonstop electronic toll collection,
and urban officials should pursue it assiduously.
2.
Competition must be reintroduced into transit. One reason
for the decline of transit is its usual organization
as a government or government-enforced monopoly. Low-income
people, in particular, are victimized by this because
they have nowhere else to turn. The healthy winds of
competition should blow, allowing entrepreneurs who
want to meet people's needs to design and implement
systems of shuttles, jitneys, or bus lines to meet them.
[40]
In
the end, good transit policies are within the reach
of every urban official. But they are not to be found
in the realm of high-tech glitz. A local official confronted
with the pitch for light-rail should go to the nearest
video store and rent a hit movie of 1962 called The
Music Man. It features a fast-talking "Professor
Harold Hill" who alternately cajoles and scares
the citizens of River City into financing expensive
instruments for an unnecessary marching band by spinning
yarns about all the wonderful things a band will do
for their children. The scheme is a scam, naturally,
and the professor plans to run off with the money.
The
professor is back, and this time he is not selling anything
as cheap as a marching band or working only one city
at a time. He is selling multimillion-dollar urban light-rail
systems, and he has gone national. The Music Man,
being made by Hollywood, ended happily. The professor
fell in love, stayed in town, and taught the students
to play in tune. The light-rail story, being made in
the real world, will not end happily. The instruments
will not be delivered, and the professor will not stick
around. It is the local officials who will remain. So
remember the pigeons.
[1.]
Martin V. Melosi, Garbage in the Cities: Refuse,
Reform, and the Environment, 1880-1980 (Chicago:
Dorsey Press, 1981), p. 25.
[2.]
Benson Bobrick, Labyrinths of Iron: Subways in History,
Myth, Art, Technology, and War (New York: Henry
Holt & Co., 1981; Owl Book ed., 1994), p. 15.
[3.]
Melosi, Garbage in the Cities, pp. 24-25.
[4.]
Bobrick, Labyrinths of Iron, p. 210.
[5.]
James D. Johnston, Driving America: Your Car, Your
Government, Your Choice (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1997), pp. 3-4.
[6.]
Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier
(New York: Doubleday, 1991; Anchor ed., 1992), passim.
[7.]
Jonathan E. D. Richmond, "The Mythical Conception
of Rail Transit in Los Angeles," Journal of
Architectural and Planning Research (forthcoming),
[Internet: http://www.the-tech.mit.edu/~richmond/professional/professional.html]
[8.]
Thomas A. Rubin and James E. Moore II, "Ten Transit
Myths: Misperceptions About Rail Transit in Los Angeles
and the Nation," Reason Public Policy Institute,
Policy Study No. 218, November 1996 (part 2 of a series
on the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority
[LACMTA]), pp. 8-9, 11 (table 3). The authors derived
the figure for Blue Line speed from LACMTA, "Blue
Line Ridecheck, October 1993, Peak Hour/Peak Direction
(7:00-8:00 am Northbound) Load by Line Segment."
The figure for Red Line speed is from Edward Shikada,
"For the Record: A Practical Approach to Providing
Mobility for All Los Angeles County," LACMTA, Los
Angeles, May 1994 (a response to Peter Gordon and Harry
Richardson, "Counterplan for Transportation in
Southern California: Spend Less, Serve More"),
p. 2.
[9.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 9.
[10.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 10.
[11.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 6.
Buffalo, Sacramento, and Miami all lost net system patronage
after rail facilities were added.
[12.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 11.
[13.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 12.
[14.]
Thomas A. Rubin and James E. Moore II, "Better
Transportation Alternatives for Los Angeles," Reason
Public Policy Institute, Policy Study No. 232, September
1997, p. 12.
[15.]
Amanda Ripley, "Missing the Bus," Washington
City Paper, vol. 18, no. 3, January 23-29, 1998,
p. 31.
[16.]
Thoreau Institute, "Why Metropolitan Planning Doesn't
Work," Oak Grove, Oreg., October 15, 1996, p. 3.
[Internet: http://www.ti.org/sa16.html]
[17.]
Charles H. Pickerell, "Urban Rail Transit Projects:
Forecast vs. Actual Ridership and Costs," Urban
Mass Transit Administration report, U.S. Department
of Transportation, Washington, D.C., 1990.
[18.]
John F. Kain, "Deception in Dallas: Strategic Misrepresentation
in Rail Transit Promotion and Evaluation," Journal
of the American Planning Association, vol. 56, no.
2 (Spring 1990), pp. 184-96.
[19.]
Editorial, Washington Post, January 25, 1998,
p. C6.
[20.]
Ripley, "Missing the Bus," pp. 32-33.
[21.]
Alan Pisarski, "Commuting in America II,"
Washington, D.C.: Eno Transportation Foundation, 1996.
[22.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 18.
[23.]
Garreau, Edge City, p. 439.
[24.]
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority, "The
Metro Green Line Turns One," news release, August
12, 1996, cited in Richmond, "Mythical Conception."
[25.]
Peter Gordon and Harry W. Richardson, "Why Sprawl
Is Good," Cascade Policy Institute, Portland, Oreg.,
1997, p. 1. [Internet: http://www.cascadepolicy.org/growth/gordon.htm]
[26.]
Stephen R. Mueller and Dennis Polhill, "Stop that
Train: RTD's Light Rail Boondoggle is on a Fast Track
for Disaster," Independence Issue Paper 2-94, Independence
Institute, Golden, Colo., March 8, 1994, p. 1. [Internet:
http://www.i2i.org]
[27.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 1,
using data provided in Pickerell, "Urban Rail Transit
Projects." The Pickerell study expressed values
in terms of 1988 dollars. The numbers used are updated
1992 dollars to simplify comparisons with later data.
A discount rate of 10 percent was used. The cities covered
by the study were: Light-Rail: Buffalo, Pittsburgh,
Portland, Sacramento; Heavy-Rail: Washington, Baltimore,
Miami.
[28.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 4.
These costs are actually understated because the LACMTA
does not include some costs that, under standard accounting
practices, should be included, such as capitalized interest
charges during construction and some general and administrative
costs.
[29.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," pp.
3-4. The figure for bus passengers includes an allowance
for the costs of highways. It was calculated on the
basis of the cost of the El Monte busway; thus, it overstates
the highway costs for buses that share city streets
with automobiles.
[30.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 2.
[31.]
Thoreau Institute, "The Coming War on the Automobile,"
Oak Grove, Oreg., undated, p. 6. [Internet: http://www.ti.org/autowar.html]
[32.]
James Riggle, "Mandarins and Money: Taking Private
Land for Private Interests: The Agenda and Policies
of the American Farmland Trust," Competitive Enterprise
Institute, Washington, D.C., forthcoming.
[33.]
Thoreau Institute, "Coming War," p. 6.
[34.]
Randal O'Toole, "Coming Soon to a City Near You,"
Thoreau Institute, Oak Grove, Oreg., undated, pp. 1-2.
[Internet: http://www.ti.org/lvsun.html]
[35.]
David Montgomery, "New Generation of City Planners
Rethinks '60s-Era Waterside Mall," Washington
Post, March 11, 1998, p. B10.
[36.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 13,
citing Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority,
"Executive Report: Rail Program Status," September
1994, p. ii; and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit
Authority, "Fiscal Year 1996-1997 Budget,"
1996, p. 31.
[37.
] Rubin and Moore, "Better Transportation Alternatives
for Los Angeles," Table 1, p. 1.
[38.]
Rubin and Moore, "Ten Transit Myths," p. 21.
[39.]
Committee for Study of Urban Congestion Pricing, Curbing
Gridlock: Peak-Period Fees to Relieve Traffic Congestion,
(Transportation Research Board, National Research Council,
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994).
[40.]
Charles A. Love (ed.), Urban Transit: The Private
Challenge to Public Transportation (San Francisco:
Pacific Research Intitute, 1985).
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